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Introduction: the challenge of knowledge 
inclusion in guidelines
Evidence-based guidelines whether national, 
regional or developed by specialty groups, must 
search for, and explicitly consider, evidence from 
sources other than conventional clinical trials and 
their quantitative data. This need for appraising 
and including knowledge from a wide variety of 
sources in guideline development is well recog-
nised.1–3 
Although evidence on statistical association—
usually from randomised controlled trials (RCTs)—
is commonly thought to be the dominant type 
of knowledge appraised and included, guideline 
developers frequently use a range of other types of 
knowledge including the views and experiences of 
those using and providing health services, under-
standing of how interventions work (eg, from logic 
models or realist evaluations), and other informa-
tion, such as aetiology and the context of care 
(online supplementary text box 1).
These different types of knowledge are used 
and needed in many situations, for example, 
when evidence from RCTs is not available, 
impossible to obtain, contradictory or inappro-
priate. They can also be used in conjunction 
with knowledge from RCTs to provide context, 
to assess relevance and to understand bias. 
Furthermore, explicit (written or spoken) knowl-
edge and the more intricate forms of knowledge 
like experiential and contextual knowledge 
can help guideline makers to take an approach 
consistent with the intentions of early evidence-
based medicine (EBM) proponents: namely, that 
best evidence is not restricted to evidence from 
RCTs and meta-analyses alone.4
However, how to properly appraise (judge) 
and include (integrate) different kinds of knowl-
edge remains unclear. Agreed methods are not yet 
available or are in the early stages of development 
and the need for and use of different kinds of 
knowledge is not always explicitly acknowledged, 
which affects the use of guidelines in practice.5 6 
International and cultural differences in guideline 
production practices may further impede develop-
ments in appraising and including a broader range 
of types of knowledge (online supplementary text 
box 2).
In this paper, we discuss four specific aspects of 
guideline development to highlight the main chal-
lenges identified by the AID Knowledge Working 
Group through discussions and workshops with 
guideline developers and users (online supplemen-
tary text box 3):
1. the purpose of guideline development;
2. the problem of induction;
3. the dominance of frequency based reasoning;
4. the challenge of integrating different sources 
of knowledge.
In order to do this, we refer to some philosoph-
ical concepts around knowledge creation.
The purpose of guideline development
The efforts of the pioneers of the EBM movement 
were primarily in response to the discovery of the 
variation problem in population studies. Reducing 
variation of the care provided at a population level 
was considered to be an important way to achieve 
improved quality for individual patients.7 Hence, 
epidemiology, the science of studying popula-
tions, gained prominence in guidelines, the aims 
of which are to support decisions for individual 
patients. Classic epidemiology became clinical 
epidemiology when introduced to the bedside 
and the dominance of RCTs as the gold standard 
for intervention studies to assess causal relation 
between interventions and effect followed in this 
construct of epidemiology as used in EBM. The 
underlying—yet little explored—assumption is that 
guidelines based on population studies provide the 
best advice to inform clinical decisions for indi-
vidual patients or situations.
However, reducing variation is not the only 
reason for developing guidelines; they are devel-
oped for several reasons, of which the most 
important one is to improve the quality of care. In 
order to meet the range of needs, guidelines may 
need different approaches, such as summarising 
large quantities of knowledge for practising 
healthcare professionals, serving as an interme-
diate product for other tools or applications (such 
as clinical decision support software) or providing 
implementation guidance. Although not primarily 
developed for this purpose, guidelines can also 
serve as tools to legally shield both patients and 
professionals, to help governments and health 
 o
n





: first published as 10.1136/bmjebm-2017-110844 on 3 April 2018. Downloaded from 
BMJ Evidence-Based Medicine June 2018 | volume 23 | number 3 | 88
EBM analysis
insurers allocate scarce resources and to act as governance frame-
works for practitioners and governments.
There is also the role of guideline development as a discipline 
in itself; along with its associated practices and institutions, it 
provides employment and intellectual interest for many.
There has been surprisingly little research into the purposes 
of guideline development. One mixed-method study found 
the purposes of guidelines were: defining norms, summarising 
evidence, formalising current consensus and/or describing current 
practices in a handbook-type format.5
Making the purposes of guidelines more explicit may help 
determine how different types of knowledge could and should be 
used. For instance, if the aim is to describe current good practice 
(eg, how services are organised to deliver care), this may be better 
achieved by drawing on qualitative or mixed-method evaluative 
research rather than RCTs. If the aim is to assess the effectiveness 
of a specific treatment or approach, evidence from RCTs or high-
quality prospective cohort studies would usually be the primary 
source of knowledge, with qualitative or mixed-method studies 
serving to help understand the local context of implementation.
It is important to note, however, that for most guideline devel-
opers, the primary purpose remains that of supporting decision 
making in the clinical encounter. This leads us to the next funda-
mental aspect of guideline development.
The problem of induction
How do different types of knowledge in guidelines development 
help to make clinical decisions? Some basic concepts from the 
philosophy of science may help to understand the problem.
Inference, the problem of induction and evasions
In logic, to infer means to conclude from evidence using 
reasoning.8 In everyday healthcare practice, care professionals and 
patients reason to reach conclusions about what has happened, to 
make predictions about what will happen and to decide what to do 
next. Because of uncertainty in medicine, we usually deal with a 
specific type of inference, called induction, where the conclusions 
of our reasoning are not always right even when based on true 
premises. In philosophy, there is a concern whether this is actu-
ally possible, called the problem of induction,8 as introduced by 
Hume in 1739.9 At its simplest, this means we cannot predict the 
future with certainty. Although this seems reasonable, we are in 
fact able to predict the future quite accurately on many occasions 
in clinical practice. How is this possible? Philosopher of science 
Ian Hacking8 argues that we never solve the problem of induc-
tion, but only evade it by applying different kinds of reasoning to 
reduce uncertainty and increase our chance of reaching the best 
possible outcome.
The dominance of frequency-based reasoning
The evasion most dominantly used in guideline development is 
frequency-type reasoning in the form of systematic reviews, RCTs 
and observational studies.5 This evades the problem of induction 
by recognising that ‘although we can’t predict the future for the 
individual case, we can be “usually” right (eg, 95% of the time)’8 
as long as events or cases are frequent enough.
Frequency-based reasoning relies on basic assumptions that 
have some drawbacks. First, this line of reasoning assumes that 
reality is dice  like and that we—eg, scientists guideline devel-
opers and healthcare professionals—are rolling the same dice 
(online  supplementary text box 4). Frequency-type reasoning 
presupposes adequate framing and defining of what is similar and 
what is not, which is always based on judgement and choice.
Second, frequency-based reasoning aims to find simple causal 
correlations, independent of context. The question is whether these 
simple correlations hold true in real life. Different understandings 
of causality exist that could help us address this drawback.10 For 
instance, a network of complex causal relationships may be more 
realistic. This drawback is described as the efficacy paradox, where 
the different interference from non-specific effects (different from 
those controlled for between groups in a trial), measurement arte-
facts (that mimicked therapeutic effects in the trial) and regression 
patterns (such as the self-limiting nature of a disease) in real life 
can outweigh the specific effect found in a trial. This paradox 
may become especially apparent when inferring in the context of 
multimorbidity.11
Finally, and most importantly, although frequency-based 
reasoning works well for frequent events (large groups, many 
data points and long periods of time), such reasoning faces funda-
mental limitations when inferring in the single-case scenario: a 
single patient, a rare disease, a system intervention and an one-off 
event. This can be particularly challenging when recommenda-
tions based on frequency-type evidence alone are deployed to 
help decision making for individual patients or unique situations, 
such as a public health response to a disease outbreak.2
Given these drawbacks, it is worth noting that other types of 
reasoning to evade the epistemological problem of induction exist.
In table  1, several alternative ways of reasoning are listed. 
They are mainly used in areas where frequency-based reasoning 
is particularly problematic, for instance in guidelines focusing on 
complex interventions, public and occupational health, rehabili-
tation, and social care and welfare.11–13
These different types of reasoning try to help make valid infer-
ences for the single-case scenario, when there is no frequency 
of events. Many of these are already recognised and stated by 
Bradford-Hill14 in his criteria for causation, but some are newer, 
such as Annemarie Mol’s logic of care,15 where a practitioner will 
try something, wait and see and let unfolding events guide the 
next step. Using this type of reasoning, the problem of induc-
tion is solved through ‘tinkering’, making incremental changes to 
improve a situation.
Guidelines can and do support these kinds of evasions by 
including different types of knowledge. For instance, providing 
laboratory information about aetiology helps to make an infer-
ence based on mechanistic reasoning.16 A description of cases 
of harm can offer an inference based on the precautionary prin-
ciple.17 Rethinking how inferences are made in practice may shift 
the dominance of frequency-based reasoning and its reliance on a 
restrictive type of knowledge to a broader spectrum of knowledge 
being used to support different reasoning approaches. The need 
for using different type of knowledge is shown by a large Dutch 
analysis showing that knowledge from RCTs far outweighed other 
knowledge types used, irrespective of the question at hand, thus 
ignoring important and relevant knowledge from other sources.5 6
The challenge of integration
Making a recommendation for a specific healthcare problem in a 
specific healthcare system requires the assessment of knowledge 
not just on its own merits, but importantly its integration with 
other knowledge. Indeed, EBM is defined as integrating the best 
evidence with clinical expertise and patient preference.4
However, in the context of medicine, and even more so in that 
of guideline production, integration of different types of knowl-
edge remains underexplored and undertheorised.
Some areas of evidence synthesis have addressed integration. 
For example, statistical techniques such as meta-analysis can be 
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used to combine data from different studies, and another range of 
techniques can be used to synthesise qualitative data.
In guideline development, most of the activities and tools 
to support high-quality evidence synthesis such as risk of bias 
assessment and quality assessment (such as GRADE) tend to focus 
primarily on frequency-based reasoning and knowledge. For the 
assessment of quality of qualitative evidence, there are limited 
but relevant initiatives for guideline development in progress, for 
example, the recently published Grading of Recommendations 
Assessment, Development, and Evaluation –   Confidence in the 
Evidence from Reviews of Qualitative research (GRADE-CER-
Qual)18 guidance. However, many of these efforts try to achieve 
integration by synthesizing studies that share the same questions 
and design (eg a set of qualitative or, more narrowly, ethno-
graphic studies),19 at times appraising18 all such knowledge again 
in frequentist terms, like with some qualitative evidence synthesis 
methods20 that ‘emphasize frequencies of the qualitative data they 
present…undermin[ing] the uniqueness of the qualitative knowl-
edge they proclaim by focusing on frequency and the general 
patterns’.21
The main issue is that these tools, activities and initiatives 
aim to integrate similar knowledge, such as data from the same 
study designs, the same populations or the same outcomes. How 
different kinds of knowledge are valued, appraised and weighed 
in relation to each other, for example, regarding effectiveness, 
efficiency or ethical concerns, is not clearly articulated.
Nonetheless, guideline developers do recognise that other 
types of knowledge are often used and somehow integrated in 
practice, particularly when discussing the evidence and formu-
lating recommendations, often called ‘judgement’ or ‘considered 
judgement’.22 23 This is the traditionally less clearly described 
or analysed black box part of the process that new initiatives 
try to shed a light on, such as NICE’s structured tables linking 
evidence to recommendations and the GRADE Evidence to Deci-
sion frameworks.22
They appear promising yet challenges remain. First, find-
ings from ethnography question whether structured frameworks 
really influence or reflect guideline development processes.24 25 
In an ethnographic study of guideline development meetings, 
Moreira showed that guideline developers formulate guidance by 
combining different ‘repertoires of evaluation, organised around 
four different epistemic criteria: robustness, usability, acceptability 
and adequacy’.24 Importantly, such criteria are deployed at each 
stage of evidence appraisal: usability, acceptability and adequacy 
are integral to evidence assessment, rather than being easily 
categorised as either ‘judgements’ or ‘additional considerations’ 
as current evidence to decision frameworks suggest.22 Acknowl-
edging the importance of these epistemic skills in evidence 
Table 1 Alternative types of reasoning to evade the problem of induction 
Type of reasoning (with 
examples of key scholars) Shorthand description Explanation
Bayesian evasion (Bayes, 
Hacking)
Learning from experience This type of inductive inference agrees with Hume that we cannot predict the future perfectly, 
but that we can learn from our experiences reasonably well. This allows us to do more and 
better predictions. This type of reasoning can update current beliefs with information from 
frequent events (informing prior probabilities and likelihood ratios). However, because we can 
learn from a single event too, this approach is suited for the individual case scenario.8
Abduction
(Peirce)
Reasoning to the best 
explanation
Abduction makes inferences by updating beliefs leading to the best explanation.28 Where 
Bayesian evasion takes prior probabilities as a given (at least as some argue), which may not 
be the case, abduction does not. It introduces the consideration of theory and mechanism in 
the act of inferring.29
Mechanistic/deterministic 
reasoning
How things appear to work This type of reasoning makes an inference based on a mechanism. Illari et al16 define a 
mechanism as consisting ‘of entities and activities organised in such a way that they are 
responsible for the phenomenon’.
Falsification (Popper) Trial and error Popper30 agreed with Hume: we cannot say anything about the future, there are only theories 
that cannot even be proven. At best, we can only prove that they are wrong (falsifiable). This 
‘anti-inductivist’ reasoning suggests to continue using a certain theory or practice and adjust 
if they fail.
Precautionary principle In case of uncertainty 
about the future prevent 
harm
The precautionary principle, often used in environmental decision making and occupational 
health, favours to take preventive action in the face of uncertainty when making an inference. 
It puts ‘the burden of proof to the proponents of an activity; exploring a wide range of 
alternatives to possibly harmful actions; and increasing public participation in decision 
making’.17 31
Means-to-ends reasoning Find ways to reach a goal This type of reasoning asks the question what ways are there to reach a certain wanted 
outcome and which of those ways would be the more efficient? Often used in clinical 
consultations to make sure that something happens whatever the circumstances. The 
inference remains uncertain but less so by using multiple means that will lead to the same 
outcome.32
Logic of care (Mol) Taking care while the 
uncertain future unfolds
In The Logic of Care Annemarie Mol15 suggests that healthcare is more like a ‘practice’ than it 
is about making choices. This approach puts emphasis on the importance of taking good care 
for the patient and the prevention of neglect. Inferring is a process that unfolds over time, 
while addressing many factors on the way.
Non-analytical reasoning 
(Gigerenzer, Stolper)
Using intuition Non-analytical reasoning such as heuristics and gut feelings (combination of heuristics 
and emotions33) used to make inferences. These types of reasoning are considered fast, 
intuitive and automatic thought processes. Gigerenzer showed that non-analytical reasoning 
can in certain environments outperform analytical reasoning in psychological, biological, 
sociological and economic inference tasks.34
Types of reasoning are not exclusive and may overlap.
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appraisal become much more important when it is understood 
that recommendations nearly always draw on different types of 
knowledge.
Second, bringing knowledge together is not just a process of 
integrating, triangulation and finding a single answer. Knowledge 
from many sources is often conflicting, and indeed the explora-
tion of opposing ideas is often very important. In social sciences, 
methods for evidence synthesis of other kinds of data have been 
developed and assessed in research26 and in practice guideline 
development,13 but these have not yet been adopted routinely in 
healthcare guideline development. A process of integration is not 
just a technical, simple mechanistic process. Guideline develop-
ment is a human, social process involving relevant stakeholders in 
discussion, debate and judgement. Therefore, the guideline devel-
opment processes also relies on a balanced and representative 
guideline committee that functions well.27
Finally, integrating many types of knowledge is not a process 
in which anything goes. Some integration processes are likely to 
be better than others. Guideline development needs to be trans-
parent and consistent so that reality, be it physical or social, can 
limit the inferences and recommendations made. We need a range 
of integration approaches depending on our understanding of 
what is true and real; for example, integration of different knowl-
edge could be based on combinations of coherence (what fits best 
in a network of other theories), on consensus (what people agree 
on) and/or on correspondence (what links best to what is believed 
to be real).
Given the current state of evidence to decision frameworks, 
there is still little guidance on how to robustly and consistently 
combine knowledge of different types without using the frequen-
tist understanding of knowledge. A broader discussion within 
the guideline community is needed about the frameworks used 
to integrate and include different kinds of knowledge. Consid-
ering theories from epistemology and findings from ethnog-
raphy (online supplementary text box 5) could be instrumental to 
deepen our understanding of how other types of knowledge can 
be synthesised and integrated in guideline production.
Conclusion
The development of guideline recommendations is an interactive 
human process that requires a range of knowledge and experience 
including, but not exclusively, knowledge from frequency-based 
research, such as clinical trials. As in the clinical encounter, 
appraising and including different types of knowledge in guideline 
development should be used to make better inferences to guide 
decisions, but in practice, arguments are used to exclude some 
kinds of knowledge for a range of reasons, including concerns 
about introducing bias in frequentist reasoning.
In this paper, we present important epistemological reasons to 
appraise and include a (wide) variety of different types of knowl-
edge to highlight important aspects of guideline development that 
await further exploration and practical suggestions.
We acknowledge that appraising and including knowledge 
from a different variety of sources is likely to be complex and 
ongoing. Discussions about purpose, reasoning and integration 
in guideline development will continue. A simple set of tools or 
methodological quick fixes are unlikely to suffice, and developing 
criteria for appraising and integrating different knowledge will 
remain a challenge. However, we believe that much can be done to 
help guideline developers improve this—now often implicit5prac-
tice that is central to their work. Capacity-building workshops 
that confront implicit forms of reasoning are one example. AID 
Knowledge runs such workshops annually at G-I-N conferences. 
They help to strengthen ties between guideline developers who are 
concerned about the increasingly rigid methodological constraints 
on guideline methods at the expense of fostering epistemic sensi-
bilities. It is important for guideline developers to feel they are 
part of a community of practice that encourages epistemic skill 
development, rather than a hierarchical community where supe-
rior guideline methods are defined by a small group of experts. 
This will help to keep guideline development innovative and 
diverse.
Acknowledging that dominant frequentist methods are excel-
lent for some questions but do not fit all knowledge needs is the 
first step to implementing different kind of reasoning in guide-
line development. How to address the diversity in methods for 
different kinds of questions should be among the top guideline 
research priorities.
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